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Abstract
In the CFA Franc zone of sub-Saharan Africa, the collective devaluation in 1994 remains
the most important incident in its history. It sought to put an end to the worsening over-
all macroeconomic position of the zone. Using seemingly unrelated regression equations
(SURE) analysis, this paper estimates the real e¤ective exchange rate and degree of mis-
alignment in 12 Franc zone countries over the period 1960-99, allowing for contemporaneous
error covariance due to observed cross-sectional dependence. The evidence suggests some
signicant di¤erences among member states, however the largest economies Cameroon,
Côte dIvoire and Senegal showed some striking similarities: just prior to the devaluation,
they were much more overvalued relative to the smaller member states, most of which were
either only marginally misaligned or virtually in equilibrium. In 1994, only Côte dIvoire
is exactly in equilibrium as a result of the devaluation. Analysis of the post-1994 period
suggests that some challenges lie ahead for the Franc zone, if xed parity is to be maintained.
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1 Introduction
Episodes such as the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Mexican cur-
rency crisis of 1994 and the devaluation of the CFA Francs of west and central Africa in 1994
have shown that growing nancial integration has increased the costs associated with real ex-
change rate (hereafter RER) misalignment, and underscore the importance of avoiding such
misalignments.1 Consequently, the increasing evidence of deliterious consequences associated
with RER misalignments combined with the formation of the European Monetary Union, have
spurned a huge increase in research related to such misalignments.The aim of this paper is to
complement such research by estimating the degree of misalignment in the RER within member
countries of the CFA Franc zone of sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1960-99.2
Typically, estimation of equilibrium RER is non-trivial and in most developing countries
this problem is compounded by the lack of su¢ cient historical data. Devarajan (1997) high-
lights some of these di¢ culties associated with various methods of estimating misalignment.
Intuitively, a countrys international competitiveness in foreign trade hinges on the level of the
RER. On the one hand, an overvalued RER is likely to lead to a loss of competitiveness, which
in turn implies hindered growth and slower convergence. Furthermore, an overvalued RER,
according to theory, opens up a currency to speculative attacks and thus capital ight. On the
other hand, an undervalued RER implies higher inationary pressures since real appreciation
will only be able to take place through higher ination. Although high ination is itself not
a preferred state, tolerablethresholds can di¤er signicantly among countries. In fact, mis-
alignments in the RER a¤ects short-term capital ows and hence central bank balance sheets,
thereby a¤ecting monetary policy. The practical importance of the RER and misalignments
make it one of the most debated issues in both theoretical and applied research on national and
international macroeconomic policy.3
Traditional approaches for estimating the equilibrium RER include the purchasing power
1 In this paper misalignment in a given period t is dened as the percentage di¤erence between the real e¤ective
exchange rate and the calculated equilibrium value in that period.
2The 8 west African countries (sometimes called the Communauté Financière Africaine) and 6 central African
countries (sometimes called the Cooperation Financière en Afrique Centrale) that make up the CFA Franc zone
each have a di¤erent currency (both called the CFA Franc), but are equally pegged to the French Franc (now to
the Euro) with convertibility guaranteed by the French Treasury. See for example Fielding (2002) pp. 1-14 for a
review of the institutional arrangements with the CFA Franc zone.
3Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates (1994), John Williamson (ed.) provides some insight into some of
these debates and the lack of concensus on estimating the equilibrium exchange rate. Also, an extensive review
of both theoretical and empirical issues related to denition, measurement, determinants and estimation of the
real exchange rate is provided by Lawrence Hinkle and Peter Montiel (eds.) in Exchange Rate Misalignment -
Concepts and Measurement for Developing Countries (1999).
parity (PPP) approach (see examples O¢ cer,1982 and DeGregorio and Wolf,1994) and the
trade-elasticities approach (see Krueger et al., 1988).4 Despite these two broad approaches, some
variations exist and there seems to be a concensus among researchers that there are situations in
which each is applicable. In fact, the main issues of contention regarding long-run equilibrium
real exchange rate (LRER) are partly conceptual and partly empirical. Broadly speaking, most
researchers agree with Nurkses (1945) denition of the LRER, but di¤er on what constitutes
the best choice of determinants and empirical approach.5 In principle, changes in RER can be
captured in many ways: using traditional single-equation reduced-form model (Edwards, 1989,
1994; Razin and Collins, 1997), by using cointegrating equations (Elbadawi, 1994; Elbadawi
and Soto, 1994; Ba¤es et al., 1999). However, in testing for the presence of unit-roots and
determining the presence of cointegration between RER and the fundamentals, the standard
unit-root tests (for example ADF tests and Im et al. (2003) [IPS] tests) typically assume that
errors are independent between countries. Coakley et al. (2005), OConnell (1998), and Pesaran
(2007) have shown that such assumptions can provide misleading results. Specically, in multi-
country analysis of RER misalignment, methods that ignore cross-sectional dependence are
likely to provide misleading estimates and hence incorrect equilibrium(s).
This paper focuses on the behaviour of the real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) within the
CFA Franc zone of Africa which has been in existence since 1948, and is currently made up of
fourteen di¤erent mainly former French colonies that have come together to form two monetary
unions. The xed parity with the French Franc has been adjusted only once in January of 1994
through a 100% collective devaluation. Although debate related to the need, or otherwise, for
this landmark devaluation goes beyond the issue of RER misalignment, it has been considered
to be an important factor in research concerning the devaluation. Many important questions
arise in relation to the CFA Franc zone and RER misalignment in light of the landmark 1994
collective devaluation. I attempt to address some of these questions: were all the CFA Franc zone
countries overvalued in the 1970s and 1980s, as is widely believed for most African countries (see
Dollar, 1992)? What was the behaviour of the RER in individual member-countries in the period
leading to 1994 to prompt the collective devaluation? How severe was the degree of misalignment
4The PPP approach takes the equilibrium RER as the value observed in the year when the current account
is taken to be in equilibrium, and calculates the misalignment in other periods. The trade-elasticities approach
denes the RER as the price of imports or export divided by the CPI and for a desired current account level, the
level of depreciation necessary can be computed.
5Nurkse, R. (1945) denes the LRER as that value of the RER consistent with external and internal balance
conditioning on specied values of other variables that may inuence these balances. Also see Edwards (1989)
for a more recent deposition.
in member-states just prior to the 1994 collective devaluation? How di¤erent has been the path
of the RER in member countries after the 1994 devaluation? Increased information about
answers to these questions is particularly relevant for current and future policy within the CFA
Franc zone. Particularly, an analysis which takes into account possible error dependence seems
particularly relevant for these countries due to inherent economic dependency, spatial spillover
e¤ects and fundamental institutional arrangements.
The policy implications of the above questions call for a methodology that explores the period
including the 1994 devaluation itself, and also accounts for cross-country error-dependence. In
this paper, I attempt to improve on previous research by making use of the fundamentals
approach, from which policy concerns can be addressed. Secondly, I conduct panel unit-root
tests that account for cross-sectional dependence by making use of a novel test proposed in an
earlier version of Pesaran (2007). Furthermore, I use seemingly unrelated regression (SURE)
model estimations which allows for contemporaneous error covariance.6 Finally, this paper
attempts to distinguish between misalignment based on two alternative equilibriumRER -
the short-run equilibrium (SRER) and long-run equilibrium (LRER) real exchange rates.7 I
nd signicant variation in observed misalignments across member-states, but also uncover
some interesting similarities; particularly between the large economies, which underwent the
steepest RER appreciation just prior to the collective devaluation. This paper suggests that
this situation may have played a major role in the zones decision to devalue.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses issues related to determi-
nants of the real exchange rate. Section 3 describes the specication of the real exchange rate
equation and empirical methodology. The data and empirical results are presented in Section
4. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Real exchange rates in the CFA Franc zone
The RER is generally dened as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for price level di¤erences
between countries. This paper takes into account the major trading partners of each of the
twelve Franc zone countries in the sample, hence the real e¤ective (or multilateral) exchange
6The validity of this approach is later tested by testing for contemporaneous correlation in the error terms
based on Lagrange Multipler statistic ().
7Here, SRER refers to the value of the REER observed in the absence of speculative (bubble) factors; whiles
LRER is a function of the steady-state values of any predetermined variables and permanent (sustainable) values
of the policy and exogenous variables, obtained by exponentially smoothing the individual series.
rate (REER). RERt may be represented as:
RERti;j = Eti;j 
Pti
P tj
(1)
where Pti refers to the domestic price level, P

tj to the foreign country price level converted into
domestic CFA Francs, and the individual country bilateral nominal exchange rate in period t as
Eti;j . Based on equation 1, the real e¤ective exchange rate (REERti) can therefore be written
as:8
REERti = eti =
nY
j=1
RER
wj
ti;j
(2)
where n represents the number of trading partners of country i, and weight wj the trade with
trading partner j as the share of country is overall trade. By this denition, an increase in
the REER (equation 2) index implies appreciation of the real e¤ective exchange rate, and a
decrease implies depreciation.
2.1 Determinants of the real exchange rate
This section briey discusses the theory which motivates the choice of determinants of the RER.
The Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect is usually considered to represent domestic supply-side inu-
ences, and may be represented by an asymmetric productivity shock favouring the traded-goods
sector.9 With a productivity shock that favours the traded-goods sector, research has generally
shown that the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates due to the excess demand created
for non-traded goods and thus there is a tendency for the trade balance to improve.
In principle, changes in composition of government spending between traded and non-traded
goods are considered to inuence long-run real exchange rate. Any tax-nanced increases in
spending on traded goods are considered to impose downward pressure on the trade balance,
and will require real depreciation to maintain the external balance. Alternatively, tax-nanced
increases in spending on non-traded goods create initial excess demand in that market and will
require real appreciation to restore equilibrium.
8The use of the geometric mean, rather than the arithmetic mean, has the advantage of treating changes in
the RER symmetrically and is not dependent on the choice of the base year.
9The Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect suggests that an increase in the relative productivity of tradablesversus non-
tradables of one country versus foreign countries raises its relative wage, thus increasing its relative price of
non-tradablesand its relative average price, and inducing an appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER).
Changes in international trade environment are usually captured by factors such as the terms
of trade for the domestic economy, availability of external transfers, level of world interest rates
and the world ination rate. Improvements in the terms of trade may lead to an appreciation
of the RER by improving the trade balance, and also by creating excess demand for non-traded
goods. Alternatively, it may also result in an overall depreciation if these spending e¤ects are
overcome by substitution e¤ects on the supply and demand sides. Reductions in world interest
rates and increases in world ination relative to domestic levels are generally considered to
depreciate the RER through increases in capital inows and the e¤ects on transaction costs
associated with real money balances respectively.
Finally, changes in commercial policy are usually proxied by some measure of trade liberal-
ization, and are generally associated with depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate.
The observed excess supply in non-traded goods sector plays a signicant role in the nature of
the adjustment in the real exchange rate.
3 Econometric specication and methodology
The specication used in this paper is based on a log-linearized form of the fundamentals
approach to estimating the equilibrium RER (Williamson, 1994). Since RER is not directly
observable, several combinations of fundamentals have been used to explain its movements.
Ideally, one may consider a list of proxies for fundamentals including government spending
on traded and also on non-traded goods, resource balance, productivity di¤erentials between
traded and non-traded goods, the terms of trade and an appropriate measure of the international
economic environment and commercial policy.10
Although there is no absolute consensus regarding determinants, this paper identies a set
of variables that may potentially act as long-run fundamentals and attempts to determine the
nature of their inuence on the long-run RER. These include domestic supply-side factors, scal
policy, changes in international economic environment and commercial policy. In this paper,
along with several variables considered in Ba¤es et al. (1999), I include government consumption
as a share of GDP to proxy changes in scal policy and then assume there exists a long-run
10Di¤erent sets of determinants have been considered by various studies. For some examples see Edwards (1989,
1994), Elbadawi (1994), Elbadawi and Soto (1994), Feyzioglu (1997), Clark and MacDonald, (1998), Ba¤es et al.
(1999); Kim and Korhonen (2002).
equilibrium real exchange relationship in log-linear form, which can be written as:
ln eti = 
T
i F
P
ti ; (3)
where eti is the equilibrium REER, F
P
ti represents the vector of permanent values of the funda-
mentals (also in natural logarithms), and Ti is the transpose of the vector of long-run parameters
of interest for country i. The empirical estimation of i requires the use of observable variables,
hence the model that captures the relationship may be written as:
ln eti = 
T
i F + "ti ; (4)
where F represents the vector of observed fundamentals. I note that, the steady state has to
be dynamically stable such that the RER will converge to its long-run equilibrium in equation
3 in the absence of any shocks.
Estimating the equilibrium RER for countries in the CFA Franc zone requires some ad-
ditional considerations, particularly due to the unique institutional arrangements within the
monetary union and data availability. Given the determinants of the RER, as described in
section 2:1, data considerations require some compromises to be made as follows: investment as
a share of GDP (INVSHt) is used to capture the domestic supply capacity and possibly tech-
nological progress (see Kim and Korhonen, 2002); government consumption as a share of GDP
(GOVCONt) to capture the impact of changes in scal policy; and the terms of trade (TOTt) is
used to capture changes in international economic environment. In addition, resource balance
is treated as one of the fundamentals, consistent with an assumption that Franc zone member-
states face an upward-sloping supply curve of external loans, thereby imposing a binding credit
ceiling which shuts down the capital account and determes net interest payments.11 To capture
the impact of commercial policy or trade regime, this paper uses a measure of openness to
international trade (OPNt).
Economic theory suggests that an increase in resource balance (associated with net capital
inow) will induce an increase in domestic absorption and shift the composition of potential
output towards non-traded goods. However, as it may be argued that the RER is one of the
primary determinants of the resource balance - one potential method is to use the lagged value
11For a more extensive discussion on this issue, see Hinkle and Montiel (1999), pages 12-13. See also Chapter
10. pages 410-412.
of resource balance to GDP ratio (RBALt 1) as a measure of the e¤ects of net capital inows.12
In equation 5 below, an attempt to account for the 1994 collective devaluation within the CFA
Franc zone is made by using an impulse dummy variable (D94) which takes the value of 1 in
1994 and 0 otherwise.
In summary, the vector F (z) represents RBALt (in levels), and GOVCONt,INVSHt,TOTt
and OPNt (in natural logarithms) and i the home country. For country i, the long-run of the
REER may thus be represented by equation 5 below, which is consistent with equation 3 (see
Appendix B):
ln eti = 0i + 
T
1iF (z)ti + 2iD94t; (5)
where 0i represents the intercept, F (z)ti is the vector of fundamentals, and t = 1; 2; :::; T
are the time periods. The steady-state relationship between RER and its fundamentals can
therefore be estimated for each country using the relationship:
ln eti = 0i + 
T
1iF (z)ti + 2iD94t + "i; (6)
where "i is a mean-zero stationary random variable. As before, the steady state is required to
be dynamically stable. Hence, shocks that cause the RER to diverge from its equilibrium in the
short-run should, in the absence of any new shocks, produce eventual convergence to equation
5. Keeping in mind the possibility of signicant cross-country residual correlations, OLS may
not be e¢ cient and the use of seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) estimations to
improve e¢ ciency is preferred.
When some of the variables in equation 6 are I(1) in levels, and "i is stationary then there
exists at least one cointegration relationship and the corresponding long-run relationship is
stable. The equilibrium RER can then be identied as that unobserved function of the funda-
mentals towards which the actual RER gravitates over time (Kaminsky, 1988; Elbadawi, 1994;
Elbadawi and Soto, 1994, 1997; Kim and Korhonen, 2002). Although time series estimations
have been used in many contexts to estimate the equilibrium RER (and misalignment) and to
establish a long-run relationship between the RER and its fundamentals, this paper suggests
that considering the e¤ects of cross-sectional dependence will improve the results.13 While re-
12Hausmann tests for endogeneity of the RBAL and GOVCON was conducted and in both cases the tests do
not reject the null of exogeneity in the data for all the countries in our sample (see Table 1). The term resource
balance is used to refer to the the di¤erence between the export and the imports of goods and nonfactor services
as a share of GDP. For an in-depth discussion of endogeneity in the fundamentals see Hinkle and Montiel (1999).
13See examples Bacha and Taylor, 1971; O¢ cer, 1982; Khan and Ostry, 1992; Devarajan et al., 1993;
cent developments have brought about many methods of estimating the equilibrium RER, the
suitability of these methods depends mainly on the nature and quantity of the data, and the
purpose of the study.14 For our purposes, given nominal exchange rate peg within the Franc
zone and guaranteed convertibility, an assumption of a common long-run equilibrium relation-
ship in equation 6 across countries may seem reasonable (as in Pooled Mean Group approach,
Pesaran, 1999). However, the formation of the CFA Franc zone was more on the basis of colonial
arrangements rather than economic design and hence, one can also expect individual countries
to exhibit some level of heterogeneity in the behaviour of institutional structures.
This paper uses the traditional SURE estimation approach, which does not assume a priori
independence of errors across countries and allows for conventional tests for contemporaneous
correlation and also provides a basis for testing behavioural restrictions across countries (such
as equality of coe¢ cients). In order to capture the possible cross-country dependence within
the Franc zone, whilst keeping in line with equation 6, this paper proceeds to estimate the
long-run relationship between the REER and its fundamentals (of the form in equation 6)
in a SURE model. Next, I use the coe¢ cients obtained from the long-run SURE model, for
each country, to calculate the equilibrium RER for each period t. Conceptually, this paper
distinguishes between the short-run equilibriumRER (SRER) and the long-run equilibrium
RER (LRER). Specically, SRER is computed simply by applying the estimated ^ to the
predetermined and actual values of the policy and exogenous variables [F (z)]; and LRER, by
applying the long-run parameters to sustainablevalues of the fundamentals, which have been
obtained by exponentially smoothing the fundamentals.15
It is important, at this stage, to note that there may be e¢ ciency gains by introducing
dynamics into the SURE model, say by adopting the Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Cointe-
grating Regressions approach (Mark, Ogaki and Sul, (2005)). However, given the number of
cross-sections (N) and time span (T ) available in our dataset, this is not a feasible option as it
demands many degrees of freedom.16
Williamson, 1994; Devarajan, 1997, Ba¤es et al, 1999.
14Pesaran et al. (1999) discuss alternative estimation methods for dynamic panels, including the seemingly
unrelated regression equation (SURE) procedure, the Mean Group (MG) approach, the Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) approach, the traditional methods  xed e¤ects (FE), instrumental variables (IV) and generalized
method of moments (GMM) and the Bayes approach. It is noted that under particular conditions each of these
methods can be used to determine the long-run parameters for estimating equilibrium RER.
15 In larger samples, the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition method may be used to extract the perma-
nent components of the fundamentals F (z)p, however in small samples BN is highly sentitive to the underlying
ARIMA specication which can be problematic . Mechanically smoothing the data is typically regarded as a
more appealing approach since individual series can be smoothed substantially more, and hence may yield more
economically appealing results (see Ba¤es et al., 1999).
16There is a trade-o¤ between the gains of including dynamics and preventing problems associated with loss of
4 Data and empirical results
This study uses annual data for twelve countries in the CFA Franc zone over the period 1960-
99. Specically, our sample includes Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo Republic, Côte dIvoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Guinea Bissau
and Equatorial Guinea are not included due to lack of su¢ cient data. The data set consists of a
balanced panel of variables constructed from the World Development Indicators 2003 CD-ROM
(WDI-2003) for each country as shown in Appendix B.17 Following Ba¤es et al. (1999), this
paper uses the consumer price index (CPI) as an index for the domestic price level (P ) and
trade-weighted index of the wholesale price index (WPI) to measure the foreign price level (P ).
A list of major trading partners that account for approximately 70% of the overall trade is
provided in Appendix A, and is based on trade volumes as reported in the IMFs Direction of
Trade Statistics (DOTS) Yearbooks. The trade weights, based on the average share of overall
trade with the home country, is a xed weight assigned to each major trading partner (equal
to the percentage share of its overall trade). Resource balance (RBAL), the terms of trade
(TOT), xed investment share (INVSH), government consumption (GOVCON), and openness
(OPN) are all constructed as described in Appendix B. The required data is obtained from the
WDI-2003 CD-ROM in local currency units (CFA Francs). Where necessary all data have been
re-based with 1995 as the common base year.
Various procedures have been developed in recent years to determine the presence of unit
roots in the panel data context thereby taking advantage of the variations in cross-sectional
dimensions as well as improving on the well-known low power of standard unit-root tests. Al-
though ignoring signicant error cross-section dependence can lead to spurious results, Pesaran
(2007) also emphasizes that in cases where cross-sectional dependence is not su¢ ciently high,
a loss of power might result if a panel unit-root test that allows for cross-sectional dependence
is used. This paper rst makes use of two panel unit-root tests: the standard Im, Pesaran and
Shin (2003) [IPS] test, which assumes cross-sectional independence and a panel unit-root test
proposed in an earlier version of Pesaran (2007) [CIPS], which allows for cross-sectional depen-
dence (see for example Coakley et al., 2005).18 Results of tests for the level of cross-sectional
degrees of freedom. Given our sample size, either decision would have its drawbacks. The decision to estimate a
static model is based on the view that it would not change the overall qualitative conclusions of the paper.
17Data on wholesale price indices (WPI) are obtained from various national data archives available on the
internet e.g. Bank of Japan; Federal Statistical O¢ ce for German data; the Economic Information O¢ ce of the
Federal Public Service Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy of Belgium; Central Bank of Nigeria; National
Statistics for Statistics and economic Studies; International Financial Statistics (IFS).
18Also known as the Augmented ADF, this is based on the t-ratio, denoted ti(N;T ), of the least squares estimate
dependence are reported in Table 2, which in turn informs the determination of the preferred
panel unit-root test result to be applied. In each case, the null of unit-root cannot be rejected
at the 5% level; in the light of this nding, a cointegration test needs to be carried out to
establish stationarity of the equilibrium error term for each country.19 In theory, one possible
and simple approach will be to apply the CIPS test to the residuals obtained from the SURE
estimation above, thereby allowing for cross-sectional dependence while checking for stationar-
ity of the residuals. However, at the present time, the implication of the results of these tests,
reported in Table 3, remain uncertain since recent studies in the forefront of these techniques
(including Pesaran, (2007)) are yet to extend to this type of residual-based tests, and to pro-
vide the appropriate the critical values. So while it is reasonable to consider a residual-based
test that considers possible cross-sectional dependence, a more practical approach is to resort
to a panel cointegration tests. For this purpose, I use the Pedroni (1999) framework, which
proposes seven tests for investigating heterogeneous panels, and allows for heterogeneous slope
coe¢ cients, xed e¤ects and individual specic deterministic trends.20 Pedroni (1997) discusses
the sample and size properties and nds that, on the one hand, for all seven statistics when
the time span is long, the size distortions are minor and power is high. On the other hand,
the evidence is more varied for shorter panels. However, Pedroni goes on to show that the
Group-adf statistic and Panel-adf statistic generally perform best. Table 4 reports the results
of the Pedroni tests and shows that the null of no cointegration can be rejected by the Panel pp
statistic, the Panel adf statistic, the Group-pp statistic and the Group-adf statistic at the 1%
level, not by the other test statistics. Given the above discussion concerning both power prop-
erties and size distortions, the evidence supports the existence of a cointegrating relationship.
Hence, a steady-state equilibrium of the form in equation 5 can be obtained through estimating
equation 6 by (in our case) SURE analysis.21
of bi in the following cross-sectionally augmented ADF regression for each country: qit = ai+biqi;t 1+ciqt 1+
pP
j=0
dijqt j +
pP
j=1
ijqi;t j + eit, where qit is the cross-sectional mean of the series qit. The appropriate test
statistic CIPS=N 1
NP
i=1
ti(N;T ) and the critical values can be found in Pesaran (2007), Table II (a)(c).
19 In this model there is no cointegration between the variables across countries of the form discussed in Banerjee
et al. (2005), which may distort the results of panel unit-root tests.
20 In its most simple form, it takes no cointegration as the null hypothesis and uses the residuals derived from
the panel version of an Engle and Granger (1987) static regression to construct the test statistic and tabulate
the distributions.
21The Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is found to be 410.73, greater than
the 2(66) critical value of 95.63, Therefore we can reject the null of no contemporaneous correlation at the 1%
level of signicance. Also Wald (1943) tests restricting coe¢ cients across countries to be equal is also rejected at
the 1% level of signicance.
The long-run parameters are therefore obtained from estimations of the form in equation
6 for each country by SURE, which have been reported in Table 5 along with the diagnostics.
In this paper, equilibrium RER is computed as ^
0
F (z)p, where ^ is the vector of estimated
long-run parameters and F (z)p, the permanentvalues of the fundamentals.
4.1 Real exchange rate misalignment
Figures 1  12 depict the estimated alternative equilibriums together with the actual REER.22
The degree of real exchange rate misalignment (Mt) in period t is simply the percentage di¤er-
ence between the calculated equilibrium and the observed real e¤ective exchange rate (REER)
in that period. Tables 6 and 7 are directly related to gures 1 12, and columns 2-13 report the
estimated percentage deviation of the observed REER from its equilibrium value for member
states over the period 1980-99. By construction, the SRER inherently shows more variablility
due to the role of the actual data in its construction, furthermore it is important to stress that
the use of the dummy (D94) and specication of the model imposes REER to be equal to SRER
in 1994, implying zero misalignment when considering misalignment in table 6; unless otherwise
stated, our analysis is based on the misalignments reported in Table 7.23
Our discussion of the results follows the general trend of similar studies and focuses on three
main periods - the period prior to 1985, 1986-93/4 and post-1994. The estimated misalignments
captures the crucial occurances in the CFA Franc zone over the period.
4.1.1 1960 to the mid-1980s:
The benets accrued by the zone between 1960 and the mid-1980s due to rising raw material
prices, when producer countries enjoyed virtual monopoly over these markets, is well known.
This was helped by the the fact that CFA Franc was pegged to a weak French Franc, which was
twice devalued in relation to the $US (in 1958 and 1969), helping to counterbalance the e¤ects
of worsening CFA terms of trade and soaring international interest rates especially after 1973.
Our results, represented graphically in Figures 1 12, indicate that while REER in a majority of
22 It is worth noting that Figures 1  12 can be complemented with condence intervals based on the standard
errors of the estimated parameters.
23When RER equilibrium is estimated using the Pooled Mean Group estimator (PMG) [Pesaran et al., 1999],
which restricts long-run parameters to be the same across countries, I found the equilibrium showed signicantly
less variability compared to the method used in this current version of the paper. However, as noted by the
authors, the PMG estimator is designed for applications in which N and T are approximately the same order of
magnitude - which is not so in our case. I am particularly grateful an anonymous referee for pointing this out in
an earlier version of this paper.
countries were not misaligned prior to 1969, the 1969 devaluation of the French Franc vis-à-vis
the $US resulted in a real devaluation of the CFA Franc - a tendency that continued until 1974.
Post-1974, the underlying susceptibility of these economies to these external shocks, including
the gradual decline in raw materials prices (in 1976) begin to bite and the the observed REER
appreciated signicantly. However, despite some bouts of real overvaluation, most member
states are known to have maintained a steady and positive economic performance.24
4.1.2 1985 to 1993/4:
Most member states began to experience signicant and rapid REER appreciation - the e¤ects
of lax adherance to the zones monerary and scal policies, real appreciation of the French Franc
against the $US, and real depreciation on the part of several key export competitors within sub-
Saharan Africa.25 This period reveals signicant di¤erences among member states. The larger
economies - Cameroon, Côte dIvoire and Senegal - are most a¤ected and experience the most
appreciation in their REER: about 29% in Côte dIvoire, 11% in Cameroon and 7% in Senegal
between 1985 to 1993.
On average Benin, Mali, Niger and Togo were virtually in equilibrium over the period,
whiles Burkina Faso, and the Congo show only mild misalignment. The most misaligned group
of countries include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte dIvoire and Senegal.
Over this period, the estimated average overvaluation (based on Table 7) is signicantly higher
in these three economies compared to other member states. The average overvaluation in
Côte dIvoire over the period is found to be 6.8%, 5.8% in Cameroon and 5.0% in Senegal;
above the relatively lower overvaluation esimated for other member states which average 1.1%.
Using the SRER (based on Table 6), overvaluation in Côte dIvoire, Cameroon and Senegal
are 5.6%, 5.3% and 4.7% respectively. Noticeably, the estimated misalignments in this paper
are signicantly lower than estimates reported in other studies which do not account for cross-
sectional dependence between member states.26
The ill-e¤ects of the CFA Franc overvaluation included an increase in poverty levels, inability
24From 1975 to 1985, average annual real GDP growth in the CFA Franc zone rose to 4.6% with an annual
ination rate of 11.2% versus 1.4% and 17.8% respectively for the other sub-Saharan countries. See Elbadawi
and Majd, (1996) for a more extensive discussion.
25This was particularly the case in the larger economies of Cameroon, Côte dIvoire and Senegal which had
the highest ination rates.
26For Example Devarajan (1997) nds a 36% overvaluation in Côte dIvoire in 1993 and 9% in 1994. Ba¤es et
al. (1999) nd overvaluation to be about 35% by 1988. A possible explanation for such a huge di¤erence may be
that the extent of bias introduced by neglecting cross-country interdependence within the Franc zone has been
grossly underestimated in these studies.
of private sector to repay debts, public sector arrears, and speculation leading to capital ight
(see Devarajan and Hinkle, 1994). By July of 1993, the estimated outgoing capital ows was
in the region of 850 million French Francs per month, up from the reported 600 million in
1988.27 With nominal devaluation not available as a policy instrument at the country level,
adjustment by deating the economy was slow, costly, and politically di¢ cult. Attempts at
country-level mock-devaluations by both Côte dIvoire and Senegal with export subsidies and
increases in import tari¤ rates failed largely due to administration di¢ culties, and rigid labour
laws that kept wages high (see Clément, 1994 and Foroutan, 1997). Figures 1 12 indicate that
the 100% devaluation in 1994, aimed at halting the ill-e¤ects of REER overvaluation brought
the economies of member states in line with their SRER. However, by considering the LRER,
this study nds that the devaluation rendered the observed REER in Benin, Chad, the Congo,
Gabon, Niger and Togo signicantly undervalued relative to the equilibrium. Our results also
indicate mild undervaluation in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mali and
Senegal. In fact, the evidence suggests that only Côte dIvoire, which commands about 40% of
the zones GDP, settles into equilibrium based on both the estimate of SRER and LRER.
4.1.3 1994 to 1999:
It has been well-documented that both GDP and ination responded favourably in the period
following the devaluation, especially as there was an associated improvement in the terms of
trade, increases in aid packages, some wage moderation and debt repayment rescheduling. Up
until 1997, Figures 1   12 show that most countries in the Franc zone were either only mildly
undervalued or virtually in equilibrium. However, by this time the largest economy in the zone,
Côte dIvoire had again become overvalued by 6.1% (comparable to pre-1994 levels). By 1998
the outlook does not look very promising as Cameroon and Senegal also follow suit, a pattern
which is seen to continue in 1999.
5 Concluding remarks
This study analyzes real e¤ective exchange rate misalignment across 12 countries of the CFA
Franc zone and makes a number of new contributions to the existing literature. Unlike much
of the previous research, this study is not restricted to analysis of the period before the 1994
27Source: Revue Tiers Monde, No. 143, July September, (1995).
collective devaluation. Secondly, the estimation methods adopted in this paper allow for the
e¤ects of cross-country dependence. Finally, this paper explicitly distinguishes between short-
run and long-run misalignments in the REER. In particular, this paper accounts for cross-
sectional dependence between the cross-sections and estimates equilibrium REER in a SURE
model that accounts for cross-country error covariances over the period 1960-99.
Specically, in addressing the questions posed in Section 1 of this paper, our results cannot
support the view that member-states were systematically overvalued throughout the 1970s and
1980s. Whiles there is some evidence of overvaluation in the late 1980s, the results are mixed
and do not support this view for the 1970s. Secondly, there are signicant di¤erences between
the estimated REER misalignment across individual member-states. On average, our estimates
are (in value terms) signicantly smaller than those obtained in similar studies that have not
accounted for cross-sectional dependence. By 1993, the highest overvaluation levels can be
seen in the three largest economies of the zone: Cameroon (5.8%), Côte dIvoire (6.8%) and
Senegal (5.0%). While these estimates of misalignement may not seem exceptionally large, an
analysis of the rate of appreciation in the REER in these countries relative to the equilibrium
value was rather staggering over the few years prior to 1994. Combined with exogenous real
devaluations of export competitors in the sub-region, speculation regarding devaluation was rife
and I have discussed, albeit briey, some of the macroeconomic ill-e¤ects during this critical
period. I have also shown that some of the smaller economies were hardly misaligned and
the uniform 100% devaluation resulted in signicant undervaluation (relative to the LRER)
in most member-states. Interestingly, only the largest economy in the zone Côte dIvoire was
found to be in equilibrium in 1994 (with respect to both SRER and LRER) as a result of
the devaluation. Thirdly, in the period after the devaluation, I have shown that the respite
o¤ered by the uniform devaluation was short-lived because by 1998 the three largest economies
of the Franc zone again show all the signs of reverting to their pre-devaluation overvaluation
levels. Overall, this paper has found some evidence of stark di¤erences across member-states,
and suggest that the increasing overvaluation in the three largest economies may have played a
major role in opting for a uniform devaluation in 1994. A major contribution of this paper may
be that it draws attention to the importance of accounting for cross-country interdependence
when estimating REER misalignment acoss countries and particularly in monetary unions such
as the Franc zone.
Using the relatively simple single-equation estimation, this study has accounted for the
e¤ects of cross-country interdependence in estimating REER misalignment within the Franc
zone, thereby providing a more complete analysis. Furthermore, Wald coe¢ cient restriction
tests suggest that an estimation method that constrains long-run parameters to be equal across
countries, such as the Pooled Mean Group approach (Pesaran et al., 1999) will be inappropriate
for estimating REER misalignment in the Franc zone.
While only briey discussed in this paper, the state of misalignment across the Franc zone in
1999 and factors such as the recent unrests in Côte dIvoire, falling export prices of agricultural
commodities, recent rises in the strength of the Euro as well as rising world oil prices suggest
di¢ cult times ahead for the Franc zone if the current parity is to be maintained, and presents
an interesting extension to this study.
A Main Trading Partners
Country Main Trading Partnersa
Benin Côte dIvoire (8.3), China (11.7), France (38.8), Germany (7.4),
Japan (4.3), Netherlands (10.0), UK (11.4), USA (8.1)
Burkina Faso Côte dIvoire (34.1), France (42.1), Germany (4.2),
Japan (5.5), Nigeria (5.9), U.K. (2.4), USA (5.8)
Cameroon France (50.6), Germany (11.4), Japan (8.0),
Nigeria (13.9), UK (5.2), USA (1.0)
Central African Rep. Cameroon (12.5), Côte dIvoire (1.4), France (64.2),
Germany (5.1), Japan (11.4), UK (1.4), USA (3.9)
Chad Cameroon (10.6), France (62.2), Germany (3.4),
Japan (2.5),Nigeria (11.4), UK (3.0), USA (6.9)
Republic of Congo Côte dIvoire (2.4), France (65.6), Japan (3.4),
Germany (4.8), UK (7.3), USA (16.6)
Côte dIvoire Belgium (4.6), France (43.3), Germany (6.5),
Japan (5.7), Nigeria (27.5), UK (4.1), USA (8.2)
Gabon Côte dIvoire (3.2), France (73.7), Germany (3.6),
Japan (5.5), UK (5.4), USA (8.7)
Mali China (4.0), Côte dIvoire (38.6), France (36.8),
Germany (6.4), Japan (2.3), UK (6.0), USA (5.7)
Niger China (2.5), Côte dIvoire (18.5), France (44.3), Germany (7.2)
Japan (6.1), Netherlands (4.8), UK (6.5), USA (10.1)
Senegal Belgium (4.8), Côte dIvoire (5.0), France (52.0), Germany (6.8),
Japan (5.0), Nigeria (14.1), UK (3.5), USA (8.8)
Togo China (3.1), Côte dIvoire (15.7), France (47.2), Germany (10.6),
Ghana (3.4), Japan (6.5), UK (6.6), USA (6.9)
a Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks. Main Trading Partnerstrade volumes make up about 70%
of overall trade with the home country. Figures in parentheses refer to average percentage share of overall
trade, and these have been normalised to add to 100%. We note here that these trade shares have been used to
compute the trade weights wj =
average percentage share of overall trade
100 .
B Data Description
1. Real E¤ective Exchange Rate (REER) The ratio of domestic price level (CPI) to the
trade-weighted index of foreign price level (WPI) each expressed in CFA Francs. This is
calculated as a geometric average across home country is n largest trading partners that
make up about 70% of total trade. The trade shares are used as weights (wj) and have
been normalised to sum to unity.
REERti =
nY
j=1
RER
wj
ti
:
2. Resource Balance to GDP Ratio (RBAL) Value of exports (EXPK) minus the value of
Imports (IMPK), as a ratio of the gross domestic product (GDP ) all at constant prices
and in local currency units (CFA Francs).
RBAL =
(EXPK   IMPK)
GDP
3. Investment Share (INV SH) Ratio of the gross xed capital formation (GFCFK) to
gross domestic product (GDP ) also at constant prices and in local currency units (CFA
Francs).
INV SH =
GFCFK
GDP
4. Openness (OPN) Ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services to
GDP , all at constant prices and all in local currency units (CFA Francs).
OPN =
(EXPK + IMPK)
GDP
5. The Terms of Trade (TOT ) Ratio of the export price deator (PX) to the import price
deator (PM ) both at constant prices and in local currency units (CFA Francs).
TOT =
PX
PM
6. Government Consumption (GOV CON) - Ratio of Government consumption as a share
of GDP , both at constant prices and in local currency units (CFA Francs).
GOV CON =
GOVK
GDP
Table 1: Hausmann tests for endogeneity of RBAL and GOVCON
1960-1999 (T=40)
RBAL GOV CON
Ben 1.11 (0.98) 0.65 (0.99)
Bfa 0.23 (0.99) 0.35 (0.99)
Cam 1.46 (0.96) 1.36 (0.96)
CAR 1.75 (0.94) 4.38 (0.62)
Chd 2.22 (0.89) 2.11 (0.91)
Con 1.11(0.98) 11.04 (0.08)
Civ 2.62 (0.85) 2.28 (0.89)
Gab 7.40 (0.28) 1.14 (0.97)
Mal 2.32 (0.88) 2.27 (0.89)
Nig 0.03 (0.99) 5.00 (0.54)
Sen 7.12 (0.31) 11.44 (0.07)
Tog 3.90 (0.69) 6.31 (0.38)
Notes: Figures in table represent the Hausmann test statistic and gures in parentheses are the respective
p-values, with 6 d.f. i.e. 2(6) using two lags of RBAL and GOVCON as instruments, both of which are
conrmed as valid instruments based on the Sargan test statistic (NR2). The critical value at 5% level of
signicance is 12.59, hence the null of exogeneity of RBAL and GOVCON cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
Table 2: Cross-section correlations of the errors in the ADF(p) regressions for individual series
across countries and panel unit-root test statistics (N=12)
1960-1999 (T=40)
^ CSD IPS CIPS
ln e 0.557 28.62 -1.354 -1.683
RBAL 0.068 3.54 -1.821 -2.563
lnOPN 0.031 1.59 -1.444 -2.215
ln INV SH 0.032 1.63 -1.463 -2.924
lnTOT 0.095 4.89 -1.852 -2.428
lnGOV CON 0.013 0.68 -1.714 -2.093
Notes: Specically ^= ( 2N(N 1))
N 1P
i=1
NPbij
J=i+1
, where bij are the computed pairwise cross-section correlation
coe¢ cients of the residuals from individual ADF(p) regressions. Number of lags included (p) for each
Individual country is determined by the modied Schwartz Criterion (MSIC). Also CSD = [TN(N 1)2 ]
0:5^.
Under the null hypothesis of zero cross-sectional dependence, CSD is asymptotically distributed as N(0; 1).
CIPS critical values for N=12 and T=40 are -2.50, -2.29 and -2.18 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of signicance
respectively (see Pesaran, 2007 Table II (b). Critical values for IPS are -2.10, -1.94, - 1.85 respectively for 1%,
5% and 10% (Im et al., 2003, Table 2). To avoid loss of power, the CIPS test statistic is preferred only when
evidence of cross-sectional dependence is signicant in both CSD and ^. Entries in bold indicate the preferred
panel unit-root test statistic.
Table 3: Panel unit-root test results (on SURE residuals)
Ben Bfa Cam CAR Civ Chd
ti(N;T ) -6.02 -3.71 -2.52 -5.88 -1.68 -2.79
Con Gab Mal Nig Sen Tog
ti(N;T ) -1.75 -1.87 -3.53 -5.00 -0.95 -3.88
CIPS(N;T ) -3.30
Notes: In this table, ti(N;T ) represents the t-ratio of the lagged dependent variable (qt 1) in the
cross-sectionally augmented ADF regression for country i of the form
qit= ai+biqi;t 1+ciqt 1+
pP
j=0
dijqt j+
pP
j=1
ijqi;t j+eit, where qt is representing the residuals
obtained from equation 6, again using the Modied Schwartz Information Criteria (MSIC) to select the
appropriate lag-length p. CIPS, the appropriate panel test statistic, is a computed as
CIPS = N 1
NP
i=1
ti(N;T ).
Table 4: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Test
Panel Panel Panel Panel Group Group Group
-statistic -statistic pp-statistic adf-statistic -statistic pp-statistic adf-statistic
-0.8098 0.2276 -2.9671 -3.1109 1.3241 -2.9327 -2.9685
Notes: Critical values at 5% (1%) level for panel v-statistic and the other six statistics are 1.645 and -1.645
(1.96 and -1.96) respectively. ;; indicates rejection of the null of no cointegration at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. The formulae for computing these statistics can be found in Table 1 of Pedroni (1999). Panel  is
a nonparametric variance ratio statistic. Panel  and Panel pp are analogous to the nonparametric
Phillips-Perron p- and t -statistics respectively. Panel-adf is a parametric statistic based on the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic. Group  is analogous to the Phillips-Perron p-statistic. Group-pp and Group-adf
are analogous to the Phillips-Perron t -statistic and the ADF statistic respectively.
Figures 1-12: Time series plots of REER, SRER and LRER for individual member-states.
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Fig. 1. The REER for Benin, 1960-99 (1995
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Fig. 2. The REER for Burkina Faso,
1960-99 (1995 REER = 100)
Table 5: SURE regression estimates and diagnostic statistics
1960-1999 (T=40)
C RBAL ln INV SH lnGOV CON lnTOT lnOPN D94 R2 DW S:E:
Ben 4.36 -0.96 -0.01 -0.001 -0.07 -0.17 -0.22 0.56 1.48 0.05
(0.15) (0.17) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Bfa 3.73 -0.56 -0.28 -0.02 0.13 -0.25 -0.22 0.55 1.82 0.10
(0.22) (0.52) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09)
Cam 5.65 1.54 0.03 0.42 0.11 0.49 -0.05 0.52 1.61 0.20
(0.33) (0.40) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18)
CAR 3.82 0.23 0.17 -0.71 0.35 0.23 -0.12 0.63 1.59 0.13
(0.24) (0.60) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
Chd 3.08 -1.62 -0.35 -0.44 -0.85 0.62 0.18 0.48 1.94 0.09
(0.47) (-1.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.23) (0.33) (0.28)
Con 5.31 1.15 -0.004 0.21 0.32 0.07 -0.15 0.37 1.53 0.13
(0.09) (0.23) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Civ 5.12 -0.007 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.20 -0.50 0.55 1.50 0.31
(0.20) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) (0.15) (0.13)
Gab 4.25 -1.06 -0.22 -0.24 0.05 0.25 -0.22 0.52 1.69 0.13
(0.21) (0.20) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16)
Mal 4.96 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.27 0.18 -0.03 0.75 1.26 0.06
(0.16) (0.20) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Nig 4.99 0.39 0.06 -0.05 0.30 0.19 -0.26 0.70 1.93 0.08
(0.14) (0.24) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Sen 5.27 1.84 -0.08 0.58 0.19 -0.49 -0.09 0.25 1.50 0.17
(0.76) (0.75) (0.13) (0.26) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
Tog 4.81 -0.24 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.08 -0.24 0.54 1.22 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Notes: Figures in table represent the SURE estimates, and the gures in parentheses are the standard errors.
C refers to the intercept; R2 to the Adjusted R2; DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic and SE refers to the
standard error of the regression.;; indicates statistical signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of
signicance respectively.
Table 6: Estimated overvaluation in the REER based on SRER: 1980-99
Ben Bfa Cam CAR Civ Chd Con Gab Mal Nig Sen Tog
1980 0.0 -2.1 -4.3 0.8 -7.4 -0.5 2.7 1.9 -2.7 -1.4 -4.1 -0.3
1981 -1.5 -2.5 -4.9 0.6 -9.8 -1.5 2.8 -2.9 -1.8 1.0 -4.1 0.1
1982 0.5 -0.7 -3.0 0.0 -9.8 1.1 1.4 -0.3 -0.8 1.1 -4.5 0.4
1983 -1.0 -1.1 -4.0 -1.3 -10.3 -3.2 0.9 -1.9 0.6 -2.0 -4.9 0.8
1984 -1.1 -1.9 -7.8 -4.0 -14.5 -2.5 1.5 -1.1 0.0 -0.5 -4.1 -1.7
1985 1.0 2.7 -3.2 3.2 -4.5 1.8 3.4 0.5 -0.8 1.4 0.4 -0.3
1986 0.1 1.3 3.5 2.8 4.4 0.4 -0.8 1.8 0.4 1.3 3.4 0.6
1987 1.5 1.4 10.0 2.8 6.8 0.3 2.6 4.2 0.2 0.5 5.1 1.5
1988 -1.9 1.4 7.1 1.7 5.7 0.6 0.3 2.4 -0.9 -1.1 3.3 0.4
1989 0.0 1.8 4.5 2.2 6.5 1.5 3.7 2.9 -0.6 0.0 4.2 0.4
1990 0.6 2.9 4.3 4.4 2.8 3.8 2.4 4.9 -0.1 1.7 5.2 0.2
1991 0.9 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 1.3 2.8 0.5 0.6 4.7 0.3
1992 0.3 2.6 3.4 3.6 6.4 1.2 -0.2 0.0 0.7 -1.8 5.8 -0.5
1993 -0.2 2.3 6.5 2.8 9.2 0.9 -2.5 0.4 1.3 -2.4 5.9 -0.4
1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1995 -0.8 -3.1 2.4 -1.0 8.8 -1.9 -3.8 -0.7 3.0 -2.1 1.7 -0.5
1996 -1.4 -2.1 0.1 -0.5 7.0 -2.9 -5.0 -3.2 1.6 -2.7 0.7 -1.1
1997 -1.2 -1.7 1.1 -2.5 6.1 1.6 -3.6 -3.5 0.1 -2.5 -0.2 -0.8
1998 1.0 -0.9 1.4 -1.2 5.6 0.5 -7.5 -2.5 0.6 -0.3 2.1 -0.6
1999 -0.3 0.0 2.5 -1.4 13.4 0.9 -5.0 -4.0 -0.5 -1.7 5.3 -1.8
Notes: Misalignment is computed as (SRER Actual REER)  100=(Actual REER). A negative
(positive) entry represents overvaluation (undervaluation) of the CFA Franc. All entries are computed from
estimates of the SRER and the actual REER, where SRER is the tted REER values obtained directly
from the regression based on equation 6.
Table 7: Estimated overvaluation in the REER based on LRER (SustainableREER): 1980-99
Ben Bfa Cam CAR Civ Chd Con Gab Mal Nig Sen Tog
1980 0.6 -1.3 0.1 2.1 7.2 -1.0 3.9 2.3 -1.5 0.0 -4.1 -2.0
1981 -1.4 -2.6 -3.8 0.9 -5.8 -1.4 4.5 0.9 -1.9 -0.4 -6.0 -0.1
1982 -0.5 -1.3 -5.2 2.7 -9.3 -1.9 1.8 -1.8 -0.2 1.0 -3.9 0.3
1983 -1.5 0.7 -2.2 -0.1 -10.6 -1.0 0.1 -0.8 0.6 -2.1 -3.1 0.5
1984 -3.0 -1.9 -3.0 -3.3 -11.2 -0.8 0.8 -3.1 0.6 -2.5 -3.5 -1.6
1985 0.4 0.1 -1.8 2.8 -8.4 -2.9 2.9 0.7 1.3 1.5 0.3 -0.3
1986 1.0 3.2 2.4 2.3 3.8 0.2 -2.7 2.3 0.6 1.6 4.2 1.2
1987 1.7 2.2 7.6 2.4 11.0 1.4 0.9 1.7 0.8 0.7 5.4 1.3
1988 -0.8 1.9 7.1 3.1 6.7 1.3 -0.1 1.7 -0.9 -1.9 3.8 -0.1
1989 -0.7 2.2 8.5 3.0 8.1 1.8 3.1 3.6 -0.7 -1.2 5.4 0.6
1990 0.9 2.1 7.5 2.7 7.3 2.5 3.2 4.3 0.9 0.2 4.7 0.7
1991 0.3 3.0 5.3 3.8 4.1 4.3 1.5 1.9 0.5 -0.6 4.8 -0.1
1992 0.1 2.9 4.0 3.1 5.8 0.9 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -2.1 5.7 -0.5
1993 0.0 2.9 4.0 2.8 7.9 1.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.9 -2.5 6.1 -1.1
1994 -5.8 -2.7 -1.9 -1.4 -0.2 -5.3 -10.7 -7.5 -2.2 -7.8 -1.2 -5.4
1995 -0.1 -2.4 1.8 0.4 8.6 -0.5 -4.6 -1.1 3.1 -2.2 2.0 -0.9
1996 -1.1 -4.1 1.1 -2.7 7.5 -1.3 -4.3 -2.8 2.0 -2.7 0.9 -1.5
1997 -1.3 -2.9 -0.3 -2.0 6.1 -2.7 -4.8 -3.0 0.5 -2.8 0.5 -0.5
1998 1.2 -0.9 1.7 -2.5 7.9 -0.2 -7.7 -2.9 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.0
1999 -0.4 -0.6 3.7 -2.2 11.7 1.9 -4.0 -4.0 -1.0 -2.6 5.0 -1.9
Notes: Misalignment is computed as (LRER Actual REER)  100=(Actual REER). A negative
(positive) entry represents overvaluation (undervaluation) of the CFA Franc. All entries are computed from
estimates of the LRER and the actual REER, where LRER is dened as the tted REER with all
fundamentals replaced by sustainablevalues obtained through exponential smoothing methods.
85
90
95
100
105
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
LRER REER SRER
Fig. 3. The REER for Cameroon, 1960-99
(1995 REER = 100)
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Fig. 4. The REER for Central African
Republic, 1960-99 (1995 REER = 100)
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Fig. 5. The REER for Chad, 1960-99 (1995
REER = 100)
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Fig. 6. The REER for Côte dIvoire,
1960-1999 (1995 REER = 100)
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Fig. 7. The REER for the Congo, 1960-99
(1995 REER = 100)
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Fig. 8. The REER for Gabon, 1960-99 (1995
REER = 100)
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Fig. 9. The REER for Mali, 1960-99 (1995
REER = 100)
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Fig. 10. The REER for Niger, 1960-99 (1995
REER = 100)
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Fig. 11. The REER for Senegal, 1960-99
(1995 REER = 100)
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Fig. 12. The REER for Togo, 1960-99 (1995
REER = 100)
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